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Comment Erzo F. P. Luttmer
This chapter tackles the important question of how the Social Security
beneﬁt formula can be adjusted so that it generates fewer incentives for in-
dividuals to retire early. Social Security provides retirement incentives
when the additional Social Security taxes paid by postponing retirement
for a year exceed the increase in the present value of future Social Security
beneﬁts from working this additional year. Goda, Shoven, and Slavov re-
fer to this diﬀerence, when expressed as a fraction of earnings, as the im-
plicit Social Security tax. Two features in the current Social Security law
cause this implicit Social Security tax to be high for individuals with long
careers. First, the current Social Security law bases beneﬁts on the average
of the thirty-ﬁve highest years of indexed earnings. Thus, current earnings
will increase this average less for individuals who already have worked for
thirty-ﬁve years than for individuals who have not yet worked thirty-ﬁve
years because for the former group the current year’s earnings crowd out a
prior year’s earnings in the beneﬁt formula. Second, the progressivity of
Social Security beneﬁts depends on the average indexed earnings of the
highest thirty-ﬁve years of earnings (including years with zero earnings)
rather than basing this average only on those years with positive earnings.
As a result, Social Security redistributes from workers with long careers to
those with short careers even if these two groups have the same earnings
per year worked. This redistribution further raises the implicit Social Se-
curity tax on those with longer careers.
Goda, Shoven, and Slavov analyze a reform proposal that would reduce
the implicit early retirement incentives in the Social Security beneﬁt rules.
This reform would base beneﬁts on the average of the forty highest years of
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search.positive indexed earnings (i.e., excluding years with zero earnings) and re-
duce beneﬁts pro rata based on the number of years with positive earnings
for people who have fewer than forty years of positive earnings. For ex-
ample, a person with twenty years of positive earnings would receive half
the beneﬁts of someone who has the same average earnings based on forty
years of positive earnings. Finally, after forty years of positive earnings,
one would become “paid-up,” that is, exempt from paying any further So-
cial Security taxes. Under this proposal, Social Security beneﬁts and the
Social Security tax rate are adjusted such that average beneﬁts and average
Social Security tax revenue are the same as under the current law.
Using data on a 1 percent random sample of Social Security beneﬁciar-
ies in 2004 who started working after or during 1951 and claim beneﬁts
based on their own earnings record, Goda, Shoven, and Slavov carefully
evaluate the reform proposal’s impact on the Social Security incentive to
retire as well as its distributional impact. They ﬁnd that this reform would
lead to a sharp reduction in retirement incentives: the implicit Social Se-
curity tax rate would fall substantially, typically by 4 to 7 percentage
points, for men and women between the ages of ﬁfty and seventy. As a re-
sult, Social Security would no longer provide this group of workers with an
incentive to retire early. By design, this proposal would increase beneﬁts
for those with longer careers at the expense of those with shorter careers.
However, the reform does not substantially aﬀect the overall progressivity
of the Social Security system. The proposed reform would reduce the av-
erage beneﬁts of women relative to those of men, but this can be ﬁxed with
a minor adjustment.
Goda, Shoven, and Slavov analyze one of three implicit marginal Social
Security taxes, namely the implicit Social Security tax “on postponing re-
tirement by one year.” In other words, it is the implicit tax on working this
year when the counterfactual is retiring in the following year. This is prob-
ably the most plausible counterfactual for older workers. The second im-
plicit Social Security tax is the tax on the extensive margin of working this
year holding labor supply constant in the future years. In other words, it is
the incentive to take one year oﬀ from working, for example, for child care
or schooling reasons. This margin is probably the more relevant one for
younger workers. Finally, there is the implicit Social Security tax on the in-
tensive margin: the eﬀect of earning one extra dollar on expected Social Se-
curity beneﬁts net of taxes holding earnings in all other years constant.
Feldstein and Samwick (1992) also calculate implicit Social Security
taxes and ﬁnd, in apparent contradiction to Goda, Shoven, and Slavov’s
ﬁndings, that these tax rates fall with age. Goda, Shoven, and Slavov attri-
bute this diﬀerence to the fact that Feldstein and Samwick only calculate
implicit marginal Social Security tax rates for workers with at most thirty-
ﬁve years of earnings. This, however, is not the reason why Feldstein and
Samwick obtain diﬀerent results. The diﬀerence in ﬁndings arises because
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tensive margin, while Goda, Shoven, and Slavov examine the implicit So-
cial Security tax on postponing retirement. The implicit Social Security tax
on the intensive margin is lowest in those years included in the thirty-ﬁve
highest years, whether or not they crowd out other years, and, therefore,
this tax will remain relatively low for workers with a long work history as
long as current earnings end up belonging to the thirty-ﬁve years of high-
est earnings. The Social Security system distorts labor supply decisions on
both the intensive and extensive margins and may cause signiﬁcant dead-
weight loss on each of these margins because of preexisting distortions. It
would, therefore, be worthwhile to also examine how the proposed reform
would aﬀect these other two implicit marginal Social Security tax rates.
While Goda, Shoven, and Slavov present a compelling case that the re-
form proposal would improve incentives without having a major redistrib-
utive impact, it is less clear that the reform proposal is optimal. For ex-
ample, the rules on the treatment of spouses imply high implicit Social
Security taxes for individuals who will claim beneﬁts based on their
spouse’s earnings. Perhaps the political viability of altering these rules is
low, but it would be interesting to explore whether these rules can be ad-
justed to reduce implicit marginal Social Security tax rates with a distrib-
utional impact that is roughly neutral. More narrowly, the proposal cur-
rently analyzed by Goda, Shoven, and Slavov contains two parameters: the
number of years of earnings that are included in the Social Security bene-
ﬁt formula and the number of years of earnings needed to reach the paid-
up status. It would be relatively easy to analyze the impact of reforms that
use diﬀerent values for these parameters. For example, would retirement
incentives be further reduced if both parameters were set at ﬁfty?
A key component of the proposal analyzed by Goda, Shoven, and
Slavov is that progressivity is based on average earnings in years with pos-
itive earnings rather than on average earnings regardless of whether earn-
ings were positive. For practical purposes, the proposal deﬁnes positive
earnings as earnings exceeding 5 percent of the earnings cap. This raises
two issues. The ﬁrst is practical. Holding lifetime income constant, the new
proposal is more generous toward those who have more years with positive
earnings. This creates incentives for individuals to shift earnings in order
to attain this earnings threshold in each year. It would be useful to ascer-
tain whether these incentives are strong enough that possibilities for gam-
ing the system would become a serious concern. The second issue concerns
the deeper theoretical point of whether income redistribution should be
based on annual earnings or on lifetime earnings. As Liebman (2003) dis-
cusses, this issue is largely unresolved because it depends on how well each
measure proxies for unobserved true ability. If, as seems plausible, both
measures contain useful information about unobserved true ability, using
a combination of both measures is optimal. Given that the majority of the
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annual (or sometimes even monthly) income, having some redistribution
based on a measure of lifetime earnings, as currently is the case with Social
Security, may well be optimal.
The chapter raises the empirical question of whether individuals under-
stand the implicit retirement incentives from the Social Security system
and whether they respond to them. The sharp break in retirement incen-
tives induced by already having thirty-ﬁve years of positive earnings can be
exploited to estimate this response. David Seif, Jeﬀrey Liebman, and I are
currently analyzing this, and preliminary results indicate that the retire-
ment hazard rate starts to increase sharply as soon as individuals have
thirty-ﬁve years of positive earnings. This suggests that Goda, Shoven, and
Slavov’s concern about these implicit retirement incentives is pertinent and
that the reform proposal will cause people to retire later.
Overall, this chapter makes an important contribution to the debate
about Social Security reform because it makes a compelling case that a rel-
atively straightforward and plausibly politically viable adjustment to the
Social Security beneﬁt formula can drastically reduce incentives from So-
cial Security to retire early without major redistributive consequences. A
reduction of the implicit Social Security tax will produce a ﬁrst-order wel-
fare gain because the implicit Social Security tax comes on top of other dis-
tortions, most notably from income taxation, that already encourage early
retirement.
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